This paper explores the extent of current UK government spending on science and technology placed in its recent historical context. The allocation of this spending across the different arms of government, the primary purposes of the expenditures undertaken and the extent to which the government performs as well as funds R&D are also explored, with some international comparisons analysed. The political and institutional processes that determine the revealed patterns of expenditure in the UK, the rationales behind such spending and the aims and objectives of the main spending departments are discussed, as is the interaction with EU expenditures on science and technology. The effectiveness of or pay-off to government support of this kind is also considered before future spending plans are addressed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The UK government, in common with the governments of most developed economies, expends large amounts annually either directly upon, or in support of, scientific and technological activities. The aim of this paper is to review this expenditure. In the sections below, I will address several issues. I begin by looking at the extent of current government spending and place this in its recent historical context. I then move to consider what arms of government incur the relevant expenditures, the primary purposes of the expenditures undertaken and the extent to which the government performs as well as funds R&D. These patterns are then considered in the context of a comparison with other OECD economies.
Following this review of spending patterns, Section III addresses the political and institutional processes that determine the revealed patterns of expenditure in the UK, the rationales behind such spending and the aims and objectives of the main spending departments. A special discussion then follows in Section IV on how national patterns of such expenditure interact with EU expenditures on science and technology.
Section V of the paper addresses the effectiveness of or pay-off to government support of this kind before the penultimate section addresses future spending plans. Some conclusions are provided in Section VII.
II. PATTERNS OF UK GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Source and Definitions
In contrast to, for example, Germany or increasingly France, public support for science and technology in the UK is largely the preserve of central government (defining central government to include the Scottish Office, the Welsh Office and the Northern Ireland Office). In Germany, on the other hand, the Länder are important providers of such support (for example, they are the main funders of universities), but the level of local authority spending on such activities is not important in the UK. Of course, this pattern may well change with devolution, especially if one redefines the Scottish Office and the Welsh Office as no longer part of central government.
The patterns of central government funding of science and technology have been well documented since the early 1980s in a series of publications. These included annual HMSO editions of the Annual Review of Government Funded Research and Development, which was followed by Forward Look, which in turn has been replaced by Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998 (SET98) . Over the years, there have been refinements to the statistics and some redefinitions, but intertemporal comparisons are largely reasonable. SET98 is the source for all the data used here (except where otherwise stated) and covers realised outcomes in the accounting years 1986-87 to 1997-98 (the 1997-98 figures are estimated outcomes). The notes to the statistics in this publication detail the changes in methods of collection and calculation and thus any problems of intertemporal comparisons. Earlier data are taken from the other publications already mentioned except where specified.
In the period since the statistics were first published, there has been a changing emphasis in what is made available. The latest statistics emphasise science, engineering and technology (SET) activities in the UK, whereas earlier statistics emphasised research and development (R&D). SET is taken to include not only R&D but also technology transfer activities ('activities associated with research and development and contributing to the dissemination and application of scientific and technical knowledge' -SET98, p. 1) and scientific and technical postgraduate education and training.
In the statistics, science is defined as 'the systematic study of nature and behaviour of the material and physical universe' whereas technology is the 'practical application of this knowledge especially in industry and commerce'. This is not the only or even generally most useful means of distinction (see Dasgupta and David (1987) ). Research and development concerns the 'gathering and use of new scientific and technological information, involving theoretical conjecture, observation, experiment, measurement and deduction' (SET98, p. 1). The OECD has for many years collected and published internationally comparative statistics on R&D on the basis of the definitions laid out in the (socalled) Frascati Manual. This makes international comparisons generally valid.
There is a mass of data available but I present data for only a limited number of years. I have chosen to concentrate upon 1997-98 as the latest year for which out-turn data are available, the three years immediately prior to this as indicators of recent history, 1987-88 as an indicator of 10 years prior, and occasionally 1981-82 as an indicator of much more distant history, being the earliest date for which good data are available. Table 1 provides data on a number of indicators of total UK government spending on SET and R&D. These data tell a very clear story. First, total government expenditure on SET and R&D has, over the last 10 years, been on a downward trend. Although an increase is recorded between 1994-95 and 1995-96, the increase is less than the NHS spend that is excluded from the 1994-95 statistics. In fact, government expenditure on R&D (excluding the NHS) peaked in 1985-86 at £6,955 million (in 1996-97 prices) . This decline in government spend is obviously reflected in declines in such spends relative to GDP, total government spending and the total R&D spend in the economy. One may also note that the share of non-R&D activities in total SET (excluding the NHS) has been declining. This stood at 4.1 per cent in 1986-87 and had fallen to 2.2 per cent in 1997-98, although it did increase slightly between 1994-95 and 1995-96 .
Total UK Public Expenditure on SET and R&D
Departmental Spends
One means to explore the pattern of government R&D spending is to look at the spending by individual government departments. For this purpose, I split the data down by departments or ministries, with the Research Councils treated as if they were government departments. However, the Research Councils are really quite different organisations from government departments. Over the years, government departments have also been amalgamated and renamed, and thus presentation is a little messy. Table 2 , however, presents some summary indications of spending patterns in 1997-98 and 1987-88. Consider first the allocation of funding in 1997-98. We observe that the MOD share is 34.5 per cent, the total civil departments' share is 21.6 per cent, the science budget share (OST plus the Research Councils) is 21.2 per cent and the HE Funding Council share is 17 per cent. Compared with 1987-88, the MOD share has fallen from 42.7 per cent and the civil departments' share has fallen from 24.9 per cent whereas the science budget share has risen from 13.9 per cent and the higher education (HE) funding share has increased from 16.2 per cent. However, as these are shares in a reducing total, the actual changes in total expenditure are also worth noting. The MOD spend has fallen 29.5 per cent in real terms, the civil departments' spend has fallen by 24.4 per cent, the HE funding spend has decreased by 9 per cent and only the science budget has increased, that increase being 33 per cent.
Thus, although the MOD is still the largest public spender on R&D and spends more than all the civil departments put together, the MOD spend has been falling faster than that of the civil departments (both spends have been reducing). The spend on HE funding has slightly increased its share, but within a falling £ million, 1996-97 prices 1997-98 1996-97 1995-96 1994-95 1987-88 1981- total this means a reduced spend. The science budget has been increasing in real terms (although very recently -see below -the pattern is slightly different) and thus also increasing its share.
Within the civil departments, we observe a number of points worthy of comment. The major spenders in 1997-98 are, in order, the NHS, the DTI, the DETR, MAFF, the DFEE and the DFID. Compared with 1987-88, we have no figures for the NHS; for the DETR, the relative comparators are the DOE and the DOT whose total expenditure in 1987-88 was less, while MAFF spending has reduced considerably. This is at least partly attributable to a policy of progressive withdrawal from the provision of subsidised agricultural advice which was completed by March 1996. The DTI is a slightly more complex case which will be discussed in some more detail in Section III. The current DTI incorporates the Office of Science and Technology (which is accounted for separately), has responsibility for aerospace and thus the Launch Aid scheme which is discussed in Section V, and also incorporates what used to be the Department of Energy. The DTI and the Department of Energy had a combined SET spend of £864.9 million in 1987-88. By 1997-98, the DTI spend (excluding Launch Aid and the OST) was only £341 million. Given that the DTI is the main department responsible for stimulating technological innovation in UK industry, the extent of this withdrawal of funding is dramatic.
One of the long-term trends in departmental civil spending on R&D has been the increasing importance of the DTI and the centralisation of responsibilities for civil R&D spending. Historically, support for civil technology development in UK industry (excluding agriculture and the NHS) was concentrated upon aerospace, nuclear energy, computers (or IT) and other general industry support programmes. At various times, these spending responsibilities have been allocated to the Department of Energy, an Aircraft Ministry and the Department of Industry, or their equivalents in name. In 1964, the new Labour government created the Ministry of Technology which was an attempt to centralise in one department nearly all government support for R&D spending directed at British industry. That department eventually disappeared. However, since then the DTI has become responsible for all these areas of policy. With the inclusion of the OST in the DTI (although ring-fenced), the concept of a Ministry of Technology has in fact been re-created under another name.
Finally, we may note that, in real terms, the EU contribution (which is discussed further in Section IV) has more than doubled between 1987-88 and 1997-98, indicating the growing involvement of the UK in EU technology programmes.
Military vs. Civil R&D
The high level of government R&D funding attributed to the MOD exemplifies that UK government R&D spending has a strong defence bias. It is clear, however, that this bias is reducing over time. The MOD share in 1997-98 was 34.5 per cent but this compares with a 1987-88 share of 42.7 per cent. The Office for National Statistics (1999) illustrates that the 1997 government spend on military R&D represented 62 per cent of all military R&D spending in the UK, which is a slight increase on a figure of 60 per cent in 1992. Of the government spend, one-third was spent on government-performed R&D in 1997, compared with 30 per cent in 1992. Thus, although the military spend has reduced in real terms and as a share of the total government R&D spend, the government-funded share of military R&D and the government-performed share have remained approximately constant since 1992.
Primary Purposes
There are a number of ways of exploring the primary purposes or objectives of government expenditure on R&D. This section explores two. The first is a quite British classification that breaks down government spending according to the following categories (see SET98, p. 3):
(a) general support for research -all basic R&D that advances knowledge, including support for postgraduate studentships; (b) government services -R&D relevant to any aspect of government service provision, including all of defence R&D; (c) policy support -R&D to inform government policy; (d) technology support -applied R&D that advances technology underpinning the UK economy, excluding defence; (e) technology transfer; (f) other, including postgraduate taught courses.
The relevant out-turn figures are included in Table 3 . As can be seen, in 1997-98, government services is the largest funded primary purpose, taking almost half the funding. This includes all of defence R&D and thus the finding is not surprising. However, compared with 1989-90, the share of primary purpose b has reduced very little although the defence spend has reduced considerably. There has thus been a considerable shift from military spending directed at purpose b towards civil spending directed at purpose b. The second largest category in 1997-98 is general support, i.e. all basic R&D that advances knowledge, including support for postgraduate studentships. Given that we have seen above that the science budget and HE spending are a large share of the total, this is again not surprising. However, this share has increased considerably since 1989-90 (largely at the expense of technology support). We thus observe a shift of resources from the support of applied R&D for support of technology in industry towards more support for the science and basic end of the spectrum. One must always hold in mind, however, that these changes in share are taking place in an environment where the total spend has been reducing. A second way to look at primary purpose is through the socio-economic objectives of government funding. Here we constrain ourselves to just the R&D spend rather than the SET spend. The relevant data are presented in Table 4 (the latest data available are for 1996-97).
The first obvious point to make about these data is the overwhelming importance of defence and the advancement of knowledge in 1996-97. This reflects again the importance of military R&D in the UK government spend and also the spend on HE and the science budget. Of equal interest is the intertemporal comparison. Although the defence spend has reduced in importance somewhat, we also see (a) a large increase in the share going to the advancement of knowledge and (b) considerable reductions in the spend on energy and industrial development. This is as should be expected, given how we have seen departmental spends changing above.
Basic R&D, Applied R&D and Experimental Development
Yet another way to explore the breakdown of government spending on R&D is to split it into basic and applied R&D and experimental development. These days, one may also separate basic R&D into pure and orientated and separate applied R&D into strategic and specific. The relevant data are presented in Table  5 (the 1996-97 data are the latest available). One should note that, by definition, the MOD is considered to undertake no basic R&D. In 1996-97, applied research constitutes about 40 per cent of the total, basic 32 per cent and experimental development 27 per cent. It should be noted, however, that in defence, development is 67 per cent of the total and applied makes up the balance. In the civil departments, only 6 per cent is basic, 9 per cent is development and applied makes up 85 per cent of the total. In the Research Councils, not surprisingly, basic makes up 59 per cent, applied 40 per cent and experimental development only 0.7 per cent of the total.
One may note that the changes since 1986-87 are consistent with the patterns we have seen above. The total basic share has increased markedly, in line with the growing importance of the science spend in the total budget. The experimental development share has fallen considerably. This has occurred in both the defence and civil ministry spends. However, the reduction is more marked in the civil ministry spends and could be seen as a withdrawal by government from near market R&D, i.e. support for R&D aimed at technologies that are near to market launch. This will be discussed further below.
Government-Performed R&D
The UK government not only funds R&D. It also performs R&D. Table 6 details the share of economy-wide R&D performed by government and other relevant sectors (data for 1996 are the latest available; they are on an annual rather than financial-year basis). The total amount of R&D performed by government is approximately 14 per cent of total R&D performed in the UK. In 1986, it was also 14 per cent. This compares with the share of UK R&D funded by government of about 32 per cent in 1996. The government clearly funds more There are thus considerable differences across departments. The small figure for the DTI obviously reflects the true privatisation of its executive agencies. The extent to which MOD work is still in-house is an obvious contrast (although, as discussed below, this may well change in the future). 
International Comparisons
Using OECD data, we may make a number of international comparisons. The usual countries considered in these comparisons are France (F), Germany (G), Italy (I), Japan (J) and the US. The OECD data have a number of breaks in series between 1990, 1991 and 1992. We thus look at 1996 (the latest year) and 1992. The relevant data are presented in Tables 7a and 7b . One may make a number of relevant observations upon these data.
! In terms of total gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) relative to GDP, only Italy is lower than the UK. The other four comparators all devote a greater share of their GDP to R&D. Moreover, except for Japan, all the comparators show declining shares of GDP devoted to R&D, and in this the UK is not out of line. ! The share of GERD financed by government is lower in the UK than in all the comparators except Japan. This share has also been falling in all the comparators except Germany (where reunification may have had a role to play) and Japan. ! The share of GDP devoted to higher education R&D differs little across countries (except for Italy where it is relatively low). The slight increase in this share shown in the UK between 1992 and 1996 is also present in France and Japan. ! The share of GERD performed by government, at 14.4 per cent, is low in the UK compared with France, Italy and Germany but high compared with Japan and the US. This reflects the greater prevalence of government-owned research establishments in the former countries and the greater share of R&D undertaken by private enterprise in the last two. ! The share of defence spending in total government-funded R&D is high in the UK, France and the US (mission-orientated countries according to the Ergas (1987) definition) and low in Germany, Italy and Japan (the more diffusionorientated countries).
III. THE DETERMINATION OF UK GOVERNMENT R&D PRIORITIES AND SPENDING PATTERNS
The Process of Spending Determination
There is no centralised SET or R&D budget in UK government. 1 In this, the UK is similar to most other European economies (except perhaps France where one ministry has a centralised budget that it then distributes to other ministries). Instead, individual ministries determine their own R&D spends, given their own priorities and the limits of their annual total budgets agreed with the Treasury. The system is known as 'frame budgeting'.
Until recently, this system operated on an annual cycle, although since 1998 a three-year horizon has been employed. Given the limits upon the totality of government spending determined by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Cabinet, rounds of bilateral meetings between the Treasury and individual ministries or departments take place. The main purpose of these meetings is to agree the total spending of each ministry or department. These discussions tend to be primarily concerned with the total spend rather than the detail of the spends of the individual departments. Thus, although discussion may take place relating to a department's spend on R&D, the discussion is unlikely to reduce to a discussion of individual projects (unless the projects are very large). Once the total budget has been agreed for any department, that department will then determine the allocation of the funding, including the allocation to R&D, according to its own priorities. The mechanism is slightly different for the science budget. The OST discusses the size of this budget directly with the Treasury. It is the case, however, that the Treasury will not, in general, discuss the detail of that budget but will be concerned more with the total size.
Such an arrangement may seem to be a very loose one, implying no overall technology or R&D strategy and with the potential to leave gaps or generate duplication in government spend on R&D. There are, however, a number of checks and balances in place to correct or prevent this. First, there are many interdepartmental committees and groups that address issues of departmental cooperation and interaction in the R&D process. Second, one of the functions of the OST is to oversee the totality of government spend on R&D and to make recommendations to both departments and the Cabinet on duplication and omissions. Although these recommendations of the OST do not have executive authority, it is a brave minister who ignores them. Third, in the bilateral discussions with the Treasury, evaluations of past support activity may well be one of the factors discussed in the determination of future budgets and, if so, effectiveness in the R&D spend is a key to future budgets.
It is still, however, the case that this system does not necessarily generate a consistent unified technology strategy for the UK. The spending pattern is still very much the result of a number of different individuals and ministries making separate spending decisions. Partly as a reaction to such views, the last Conservative government instituted the Technology Foresight exercise. This exercise (which is currently being repeated) involved a process of widespread consultation upon those areas of science and technology in which the UK (as a whole) might best invest. The results of this exercise are being used to inform government R&D spending decisions (although it must be admitted that they appear to have had more influence on the Research Councils than on other spenders). The government, of course, has no control over the spending decisions of the private sector, and thus whether the recommendations have been influential in that area is another matter.
Technology Foresight exercises of this kind have also been undertaken in the Netherlands, Finland and Germany, for example. It is worth noting, however, that whereas in the UK the main objective was to spot technologies that might best contribute to improved competitiveness, in other countries (for example, the Netherlands) there was also a matching concern with the quality of life. The UK Foresight exercise currently under way has to some degree redressed this imbalance.
Although individual government departments and ministries do have considerable freedom to determine their own R&D spending and priorities, the UK political system does tend to ensure that, at a general level at least, the different ministries and departments have common attitudes. Thus, for example, the various Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997 had a general belief in the efficacy of market forces. This led not only to privatisation but also to a general reconsideration of government R&D support programmes, especially in the DTI. The view that 'if it was worth doing, then the private sector would do it without government intervention' led to a wholesale withdrawal of the DTI from general technology support programmes and, in particular, withdrawal from support of near market R&D. Similarly, a belief in the importance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as a source of dynamism in the economy led to reorientation of support away from large firms towards smaller firms. In addition, desires to reduce government spending and to promote efficiency have led to growing demands for ex post evaluation of programmes. This is not to say that individual government ministers did not or do not still have influence on individual departments' spends. One may observe many examples where, in individual ministries, a change of personality at the top has led to a change of policy. The point is that the prevailing political philosophy of the party in power tends to influence, at a general level, the size and nature of any public spending programmes in place. It also means that, as the party in power changes, so the underlying philosophy will tend to change. The election of a Labour government in 1997 has not seen a radical change in prevailing attitudes so far; however, we have already seen: (a) the introduction of an R&D tax credit for SMEs when such tax credits were always considered undesirable under the previous government; (b) announcements of future increased spending on science over and above the amount considered desirable by the previous government; and (c) an emphasis in the last Budget and in the latest Competitiveness White Paper on the importance of technology to the UK economy and in particular how the UK (especially the government) must invest to become a full member of the information economy.
The role of Parliament in the determination of government R&D spending is limited. There are effective House of Lords and House of Commons Select Committees on Science and Technology which over the years have issued critical reports on government R&D support activities. There is, however, little evidence that these reports have been particularly influential. In general, Parliament has not undertaken reviews of government SET support activities at a detailed level (except perhaps to investigate certain large defence projects that failed).
In addition to the general issues of the determination of the level of spending upon technology support and the areas to be supported, there is also an issue as to who should perform the technology activities being funded. From the late 1960s, there has been general acceptance in government of the 'contractorcustomer' principle, whereby the same institution of government should not be both the funder and performer of research. This principle has two advantages in that the separation of customer and contractor (a) should promote efficiency in the research process and (b) should promote objectivity on the part of the contractor. This latter issue is one of the reasons for the separation of universities from government via the Research Councils.
In the 1991 Annual Review, the government argued that the spinning-off of previously in-house research establishments as executive agencies, many of which were then later more fully privatised, enabled an extension of the customer-contractor principle (as well as enabling such institutes to compete for privately funded research more effectively). This spinning-off may well have also been a further reflection of Conservative belief in the efficacy of the market. It is difficult to be precise as to the extent to which there is separation of customer and contractor in government R&D spending. We have seen above how the amount of government-funded R&D performed intramurally differs across ministries. There are, however, some data (Table 8) for 1996-97 that are more indicative of the current position. Although there are considerable difficulties in determining what is a competitive allocation mechanism and what is not (see, for example, Cave et al. (1999) ), these figures suggest a considerable degree of competition in the allocation process.
Why Should Government Spend on SET?
The previous section has explored the process by which spending levels and patterns are determined. It does not answer the key question of why the government should spend on R&D and SET. In Table 3 , some data were presented on the principal purposes of such spending, which to some degree help to answer why. In particular, we see that some spending is for policy support, i.e. to inform government policy. This is quite appropriate. The government requires information in order to frame policy and also to negotiate with private sector contractors effectively. However, such spending is only about 6 per cent of the total. Another primary purpose is for government services, which is R&D relevant to any aspect of government service provision, including all of defence R&D. The principle here is that the government is the major provider of, for example, defence services, and, as such, should fund the R&D for such services. This element comprises almost 50 per cent of the government R&D spend. However, just because the government is the major customer, it does not necessarily mean that government should fund the R&D. The government, for example, instead of funding the development of a new torpedo, could promise to buy from a contractor a torpedo that the contractor had expended its own resources upon developing. In fact, over the last 10 years, there have been considerable changes in the relationships between the MOD and its suppliers whereby more of the responsibility for the funding of R&D is left with the contractor, as well as a move away from cost-plus to fixed-price contracts that have shifted the risk from government to the contractor. Having said this, however, such R&D is seen as somewhat different from the other R&D spends of government. It is, as its label implies, seen as a necessary part of delivering the services to the populace that the government considers to be part of its political remit. The remaining 50 per cent of government R&D spending is for four other purposes: general support for research, technology support, technology transfer and others. Such spending is generally directed at stimulating the scientific and technological performance of the economy and, as such, has to be justified on other grounds. A prerequisite to such justification is a belief that innovation will yield improvements in competitiveness and economic welfare. Justification then tends to fall into two separate categories: (a) on the basis of international comparisons, i.e. UK economic performance is seen as not satisfactory and improvements in the scientific and technological performance of the economy would assist in overcoming this problem; and (b) the economy suffers from market failures in its SET performance which means that the government should intervene. It should be noted that these are quite separate arguments. It may be that UK performance is not satisfactory in terms of international comparison, but this need not necessarily be due to market failures. All economies will suffer similar market failures and thus it is difficult to argue that market failures cause differences in technological performance.
The international comparison argument as a justification for government support of R&D needs little further explanation. Policymakers will look at the performance of other economies and wish to replicate what the good performers are achieving. However, there is no strong evidence (see OECD (1998)) to suggest that policies can be simply transferred across national boundaries when there are extensive cultural and structural differences. Nor does there seem to be any acceptance in government that a good rationale for any particular policy is that other countries are doing the same (note tax credits for R&D), although an academic literature on strategic trade policy might be used to support a contrary view. However, inferior relative performance can often be taken as a good general rationale for the need for policy. Of course, the desire to stimulate UK technological performance is not itself a justification for government spending on SET. There are many policies open to government, of which direct spending is only one. The choice of actual policy is more a matter of consideration of what policies will be the most cost-effective.
The market failure argument -the argument most favoured by economists -merits greater discussion. Market failure is said to exist when the free market will not generate a welfare optimal outcome. All the literature (see, for example, Stoneman (1987) ) suggests that there is market failure in innovation. Reasons for market failure are various and encompass, inter alia: appropriability problems whereby the innovator is unable to appropriate (through, for example, externalities, copying or pricing) the whole social benefits of his or her innovative efforts; excessive risk aversion on the part of either innovators or capital markets in the presence of incomplete insurance markets; informational externalities; and indivisibilities. All of these will tend to lead to underinvestment in SET. On the other hand, common pool problems may lead to excessive repetition of R&D and/or excessive speed or overinvestment in the development and launching of new products and processes.
If market failure does lead to suboptimal investment, there is a rationale for government intervention. The problem with this rationale, however, is that it is difficult to operationalise. Civil servants will often accept the potential for market failure but will query whether it is a practical tool for deciding where to direct intervention and the level of intervention required (see, for example, Barber and White (1987) ). It is also by no means obvious that government spending is the best means to correct market failure; it may be that tax breaks or information-spreading programmes will be more suitable.
The area where the market failure argument is used most frequently is basic R&D. It is commonly argued that, given that basic R&D has no particular application in view, there is little potential for the innovator to realise the benefits of his or her discoveries and thus, without intervention, there will be underinvestment in basic R&D. We have been informed that, in discussion about the size of the science budget in the annual spending rounds, the OST, which presents the case for the science budget, uses the market failure argument and the Treasury accepts the argument. However, little attempt is made to apply the argument on a project-by-project basis.
To a large extent, the market failure argument is thus used to justify government investment in science. Again, however, one might ask why direct government spending is employed. It would be possible to give tax breaks to private investors who fund science in universities instead.
Government investment in science raises a related issue. The basic justification for such investment is market failure. Thus the free market would not invest enough in science from a welfare point of view and, without government involvement, there would be insufficient knowledge and skills in the economy. However, the science budget is primarily allocated to universities. Although the Technology Foresight exercise has recently been put in place to inform the distribution of this budget to areas of greatest national technological advantage, it is still the case that the researchers in universities who are spending the budget are not primarily interested in the technological applications of the research that they undertake. They are generally producing information for the public domain that will raise their own estimation in the eyes of their peers. The actual process of allocating and spending the science budget may thus generate its own market failures (Dasgupta and David, 1987) . This is not to suggest that there is no pay-off to the science budget (see below), nor is it to suggest that the potential pay-offs to basic research can be reliably predicted; it is more to suggest that current allocation mechanisms will not necessarily replicate the allocations that a free market might make in the absence of market failure.
Finally in this section, I might state the obvious. The existence of market failure or internationally comparative underinvestment in SET does not of itself merit government intervention. It must be the case that the intervention will be effective. I return to consider this point further below.
The Main Spending Departments
This section looks in some brief detail at the spends and policies of three main components of the government SET machine. It starts with the MOD, then considers the DTI, before finally considering the total OST, Research Councils and HE budget.
(a) The Ministry of Defence Although the MOD spend on R&D has been declining recently, it is still the largest of all the government departments. The whole spend is considered to be non-basic. The MOD maintains that its prime responsibility is the defence of the UK and, as such, although civil spin-offs are to be welcomed, it has no particular responsibility towards wealth creation or competitiveness in the UK economy (although the MOD involvement in arms exporting suggests that the MOD is concerned with the prosperity of the UK defence sector).
There are a number of issues that can be raised with respect to the MOD R&D spend: what are the optimal contractual arrangements? Some 20 years ago, nearly all contracts were of the cost-plus form. However, now there is a much greater emphasis upon fixed-price contracts. Such contracts not only provide a greater incentive for the contractor to be efficient but also shift the risk from the government to the contractor. However, such contract forms will require that the MOD spends more on R&D informing itself so that new contracts may be 'fair'. ! How efficient is defence R&D? There have been a number of high-profile failures of defence R&D projects (for example, the UK AWACS aircraft and torpedo development). There is some evidence to suggest, however, that such failures are no more or less common in the defence sector than for similar complex projects in the civil sector (for example, certain civil software development projects in the public sector). ! To what extent should MOD defence research be undertaken in-house? It has always been the case that much MOD research has been undertaken by private sector contractors. In addition, since 1991, the MOD has been trying to put greater distance between its research funding and research performance activities. Through the Defence Research Agency to 1994 and then the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), the majority of the MOD's non-nuclear research performance activities have been amalgamated into a single organisation managed as a trading fund. This was undertaken in order to (a) impose a formal customer-supplier relationship, (b) encourage greater collaboration with the civil sector and (c) help ensure the exchange of technologies between the civil and military sectors. ! To what extent should defence technology be developed alone or as part of an international collaborative effort? Collaboration can, inter alia, share costs and spread risks as well as open up a wider market for products developed. Over the last 10 years, collaborative arrangements with Europe in particular have become more important.
! Are there externalities to defence R&D in terms of civil spin-offs? The MOD has for long attempted to encourage such spin-offs, and such externalities are often seen as a reason for supporting defence spending on R&D. However, the externalities cannot themselves justify the R&D. If civil usage is the objective, then surely it would be better to direct the spending into that area. In its list of prime contributions from its R&D spend, the MOD includes 'cooperating with industry and other government departments to ensure that scientific knowledge and technical innovation generated both within and outside the MOD is exploited both for defence purposes and by industry in support of wealth creation' (Forward Look 1995, vol. 2, p. 55) . Mechanisms considered to encourage civil spin-off include: (a) the use of private sector contractors to perform defence R&D who may spin off expertise into their civil activities; (b) the establishment of Dual Use Technology Centres to encourage collaboration between DERA, industry and academia; and (c) the granting of licences for technology developed by the MOD. One should note as well that, in 1995, the MOD was talking of the need for greater alignment between civil and defence sectors. This may also encourage spin-off. However, on the other hand, there may be spin-off from the civil sector to the defence sector that is at least as large as vice versa.
On an institutional level, the MOD maintains an overview of its SET activities through a Defence Research Committee chaired by the Department Chief Scientific Adviser. An independent view of its research programme is provided to the Minister by the Defence Scientific Research Council (DSRC) and its five supporting boards. These draw their members from academia and industry. In other work (Diederen et al., 1999) , we have also been informed that the MOD has members sitting on a number of interdepartmental bodies that address issues of complementarity in departmental research programmes. This would be particularly relevant in cases such as aerospace where the DTI is responsible for civil aircraft and the MOD for military aircraft.
(b) The Department of Trade and Industry
Although, as explained above, the DTI has, over the last 15 years, taken on the responsibility for those areas of government industrial R&D policy that were the largest-spending (aircraft, IT, energy), its current R&D spend is only a shadow of the sums that once were being expended. In addition, as we have seen above, the DTI has 'privatised' nearly all of its in-house research institutes and thus the DTI now does very little in-house research.
In fact, the DTI now considers its main activities as regards innovation to be 'to give higher priority to supporting technology transfer, spreading best practice, and accessing and exploiting existing technology rather than to developing new technology.... DTI activities are now concentrating more on influencing the broad environment which allows innovative firms to flourish and less on the explicit development of technology' (Forward Look 1995, vol. 2, p. 112) .
Of its 1997-98 estimated out-turn spend, £216 million (of a total SET spend of £341 million) was considered for technology support. Of this £216 million, £94 million went to the European Space Agency and £17 million to fusion research. Policy support received £55 million and technology transfer £79 million. One must not, of course, forget that, to some degree at least, responsibility for technology support has shifted to Brussels and away from Whitehall. This is discussed further below, but even so it is clear that the DTI has largely pulled back from not only the support of near market research but also the support of nearly all research.
There are many different programmes offered by the DTI in pursuit of its objectives. It would be tedious to list them all here. It is, however, worth stressing that its programmes emphasise help for SMEs, gaining access to overseas technology and also encouraging inward investment of R&D.
In early 1999, a new Competitiveness White Paper was issued by the DTI that laid out a conception of future policy. Although this does not contain any major change of strategic direction, it does have some new twists on existing policy. It is discussed below in the general discussion of the future. In addition, the March 1999 Budget introduced some future changes with respect to DTI innovation policy tied to the White Paper. Finally, the DTI is responsible for Launch Aid. This is one 'old-style' interventionist policy that the DTI has maintained and it is discussed separately below.
(c) The Science Budget
The whole science budget is made up of three parts -a small spend by the Office of Science and Technology, a much larger spend by the Research Councils and a large higher education budget.
The OST was originally created as part of the Cabinet Office but, with effect from 1996, was relocated as part of the DTI. Although many saw in this relocation a statement of the subservience of science and technology to the demands of wealth creation, civil servants argued that the shift had more to do with space in the Cabinet Office than any other issue. Within the DTI, the OST is headed by the government Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA). The CSA advises the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Minister for Science on SET matters. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry has overall responsibility for the government's science policy and support for science and technology as a whole in his cross-departmental role as the Cabinet Minister for Science and Technology.
The OST has two main functions. The first is the overview function discussed above. The second is a responsibility for the science budget. Although the science budget is not spent by the OST but is instead allocated by the Research Councils, which are essentially intermediaries, it is the OST that negotiates with the Treasury on the size of the science budget. The Director General of the Research Councils is responsible for advising the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Minster for Science on the allocation of the science budget and for securing the successful operation of the Research Councils, with support from the OST. There also exists the Council for Science and Technology (COST) as an advisory body made up of independent members. The COST is advisory to the Prime Minister on all aspects of the government's science and technology activities and submits its reports to him through the Cabinet Minister for Science and Technology (the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) who chairs the Council on behalf of the Prime Minister with the CSA as Deputy Chairman.
The higher education budget is the responsibility of the DFEE in England (but is spent by the HEFCE), of the Scottish Office in Scotland (but spent by the HEFCS), of the Welsh Office in Wales (but spent by the HEFCW) and of the Northern Ireland Office in Northern Ireland (with the NIHEC as the intermediary).
We have seen above (Table 2) that Research Council spending has increased over the 10 years to 1997-98; the HE funding of R&D has, however, declined although the sum of the spends of the Research Councils and on HE funding has increased in real terms in the 10 years to 1997-98 within a declining total government R&D spend. To some degree, such comparisons are a little misleading. Although the comparison of Research Council spends is valid, more needs to be said of how the higher education R&D spends are calculated. There was a significant change of calculation methods and coverage in 1993-94; also in 1996 a new method was introduced to measure what proportion of HE expenditure could be considered as research. The new method basically uses grant income as a proxy for expenditure, with research, teaching and other grants separately identified. The block research grant is counted as research. One-third of the postgraduate element of the teaching grant is counted as research.
The 10-year comparison does not show, however, what has been happening more recently. The science budget (OST plus the Research Councils) peaked in 1995-96 at £1,331 million (1996-97 prices) and then fell to £1,303 million in 1997-98. HE funding peaked at £1,073.9 million in 1994-95 and then fell to 1996-97, recovering in 1997-98 to £1,042 million. Thus the 10-year comparison hides more recent reductions in the science budget.
The Research Council structure was changed in 1994 from a system with five such councils to a system with seven Research Councils. The Research Councils have extensive independence in the determination of the funds allocated to them by the Director General of the Research Councils. However, alignment with government objectives (such as Foresight) will tend to be rewarded by higher allocations. The main allocation mechanism used by the various councils is peer review. One might note, however, that the PPARC is a major funder of the European Space Agency and CERN on a long-term basis. The BBSRC, the MRC, NERC and the Council for the Central Laboratories of the Research Councils spent large proportions of their funding intramurally (most of the balance and the funding of the other Research Councils going to higher education institutions). This 'intramural' spend essentially funds research institutes 'owned' by the Research Councils.
One of the major changes that has affected the science spend over the last 10 years has been the growing demand for relevance. This can be interpreted in many ways but is essentially seen as a growing requirement that the science budget should support research that will be of relevance to wealth creation in the UK economy. There is considerable argument as to whether research that is basic can be so directed, and even whether it is possible to predict where basic research will be of value. I remember Paul David at a conference a few years ago stating that he saw the call for relevance in UK science as a sign that science had lost the trust of government. In the 1960s, all the scientists had to say was give us the money, trust us to spend it and society will benefit. However, an inability to show any material pay-off from such spending has since then led to greater and greater demands for accountability and relevance.
In higher education, the pressures have been more to do with quality and assessment. Teaching and Research Quality exercises across higher education institutions have been performed and are used to inform funding allocations across departments and institutions. It is not, however, clear that the criteria for the Research Assessment exercises well match the relevance criteria for Research Council funding allocations.
The potential pay-offs to the science budget are considered below. Here, a more fundamental question is addressed. Why should government fund the science budget? One could again consider international comparisons as one reason. The more interesting is market failure. The literature considers that there are many market failures in basic research, ranging from externalities (the supply of skilled manpower to UK industry) through to appropriability problems. As always, however, market failure arguments are an imprecise means of deciding the size of the budget (for example, although the extent of market failure in basic research has probably not changed or has increased over the last 15 years, in the face of financial stringency UK universities have dramatically increased their income from non-government sources). One may also compare the funding of UK and US universities. In the US, private funding is more extensive. Questions that need to be answered are (a) should the government be responsible for the costs of education, especially postgraduate education, or should this be an individual responsibility? (b) to what extent should government fund basic research or should the private sector as the main potential user take more responsibility? and (c) to what extent do universities act as market institutions? (is it the case, for example, that they are more interested in peer evaluation and international reputation than the market value of their products?). In many ways, perhaps the key issue that arises in the funding of science is whether there is an inherent incompatibility between institutions that largely consider their function to be the production of knowledge for the public domain and a government pushing for greater relevance of output to the needs of UK industry which will largely benefit from knowledge kept in the private domain.
IV. THE EUROPES SYSTEM
As can be seen from Table 1 , the UK government contribution to the EU research budget has increased by 113 per cent in real terms over the 10 years to 1997-98. This reflects a growing involvement of the UK in EU-funded research support programmes.
The UK government treats contributions to EU programmes as part of departmental spending totals for the purposes of its public expenditure allocation process. Thus a contribution to an EU programme is considered as a charge against the spending total of the relevant government department. This is known as the EUROPES system. The percentage allocations of the 1996-97 £373.3 million are as in Table 9 . Clearly, it is the DTI and the OST that carry most of this allocation of EU spending.
The implication of this EUROPES allocation is that, if the total departmental spend is controlled, then any EU programmes are completely non-additional to government spending. In principle, contributions to an EU programme are an alternative to a domestic spend and not an addition. The only other European country to have such a system of allocations is Germany. However, the German system seems to be largely non-binding (as we shall see, the UK system may well be).
The reasoning behind the EUROPES system was that, if government expenditure was to be controlled, then EUROPES was a way of controlling that part of such expenditure that was an R&D contribution to Europe. The EUROPES system will encourage ministries not to attempt to replicate EU programmes at home. The problem, however, is that, within the frame budgeting system, if the frame is not adjusted for the EUROPES contribution, then EU R&D will drive out domestic-funded R&D. If EU R&D is of a very different kind (for example, involving more international collaboration or more technology support or more close to market) from the domestic R&D, then the plans of the department concerned may not be realised.
There are some doubts, however, as to how rigidly the government adheres to the EUROPES principles. In interviews (see Diederen et al. (1999) ), it was suggested to us that ministers may negotiate with the Treasury over a higher departmental budget if the EUROPES spending has much different objectives from those of the department.
One might also note that, to the extent that UK researchers are successful in gaining EU funds over and above the contribution of the government to EU R&D programmes, so there is an expansion of UK R&D spends. In 1996, the UK private sector received about £140 million from the EU Commission for R&D, with about £180 million going to universities. The total £320 million is about £50 million less than the EU contribution.
Of course, given the EUROPES system, ministries and departments have an incentive to argue for EU programmes that reflect their own objectives. The UK government plays a full role in the discussions over EU R&D budgets and spending, with the OST presenting the UK case.
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SET SPEND
This section addresses issues relating to the effectiveness of UK government expenditure on science, engineering and technology through three separate discussions. The first concerns the general literature on the returns to government expenditure on R&D. The second concentrates upon government expenditure on basic research. This is relevant because, as we have seen above (and will see below), the science budget has (and will be) taking an increasing share of the total SET budget. Then we look at one particular policy, Launch Aid for civil aerospace. This is explored for two main reasons, first because of its peculiar position in the UK technology policy portfolio and second because it is an example of an old-style product support policy that has largely disappeared from the government (and especially DTI) portfolio.
When discussing effectiveness, a number of approaches can be taken. One is to ask whether the policy actually satisfies the objectives set for the policy itself. Many of the evaluation exercises undertaken within government (very few of which are available to me) are of this kind. Such an approach seems rather limited in scope and will not be explored here. A second approach is to consider the pay-offs to policy in terms of impact on economic welfare and then compare them with the cost of the policy. Although this leaves open the issue of how economic welfare is to be measured, it is the implicit approach taken here.
Of course, once effectiveness has been discussed, one can address the issue of whether current levels of expenditure are too high or too low. To answer such questions may require a degree of precision that is not available; however, they are relevant questions to ask.
The General Issue
Assessing the effectiveness of government R&D spending in welfare terms means the consideration of a number of different issues. First, the pattern of spending is heterogeneous. There is spending to inform government, to meet government objectives (for example, defence), on training, on basic research, to create appropriate environments and (decreasingly) on particular new products or processes. What is sought from the different types of spending is different and the potential returns are different in character and probably value. Some returns will be particularly difficult to measure and value. Thus, for example, it would be particularly difficult to measure the social benefit of expenditure on defence R&D. One could, of course, explore whether the defence R&D met its objectives of developing the products targeted, but actually valuing the benefit of the resultant defence capability is much more problematic. Similarly, the social benefits of an informed government are difficult to value. In addition, the more that technology policy is directed towards the creation of appropriate innovation supportive environments, the more difficult it is to measure the return to such spending. There is, of course, a literature on the social returns to education that could be used to value training investments. It is fair to state, however, that generally the economic literature when considering the return or effectiveness of government spending on R&D has primarily concentrated upon those expenditures that are basically direct subsidies to commercial R&D. For example, a recent paper (the results of which are relied upon here to a large degree) -Klette, Moen and Griliches (1999) -surveys and adds to the general literature but constrains itself to the consideration of 'the impact on manufacturing performance of direct government support to commercial R&D projects and largely ignores … issues such as the impact of research in government labs, defence related R&D contracts, support to basic research in universities and tax breaks for R&D'.
Even taking a rather narrow approach to effectiveness does not make the measurement of social returns a simple exercise. There are many problems but the three most important conceptual problems are: (a) If the effect of policy is to be measured, then some insight into the counterfactual (what would have happened in the absence of policy) is required. A necessary condition for a policy to have been effective is that it produced additionality, i.e. socially desirable outcomes were generated by the policy that would not have arisen in its absence. At the most basic level, this might mean that the government support enabled a new product or process to be developed (or to be developed more quickly) that would not have been developed (or would have developed more slowly) in the absence of the policy. (b) To measure the impact of policy in total, one also needs to obtain some insight into spillovers. Spillovers can be positive or negative but are essentially impacts that fall upon other than the direct recipients of support. Thus, for example, if government support enables a new product to be developed in one firm, then other firms might benefit from the knowledge generated and also develop new products. An evaluation of the returns to government support ought to take account of such advantages. However, spillovers need not always be positive. It may be the case that a firm receiving support develops a new product but this product drives (domestic) rivals from the market. The measure of the return to the intervention based solely upon the gains to the subsidised firm would then overstate the true returns, for, to some degree, the measurement will wrongly reflect redistribution. (c) The final issue is the time dimension over which returns are to be measured.
It may be the case that interventionist policy today not only yields benefits today but also provides a new base from which firm(s) may build for the future. Some benefits may thus be quite distant in time. The benefits may also be quite widely spread. Improvements in a firm's technological base may not only affect its profits but also lead to higher wages, greater profits for suppliers and also higher tax returns (thus perhaps enabling some reduction of the actual cost of any R&D support package) etc.
It is fair to say that, although the general literature addresses some of these issues, it has not managed to fully resolve them. Even so, the results of the literature are informative. Griliches (1995) , in a survey of the literature to that date, argues that the returns to publicly funded R&D are less than those to privately funded R&D. He does, however, note estimates of the social returns to public R&D in agriculture in the range 20-80 per cent. Klette, Moen and Griliches (1999) , in their more recent work, point out that there are a number of approaches in the literature addressing the effectiveness of R&D. They rule out discussion of case studies and I follow them in concentrating on econometric evaluation. I will not repeat their useful discussion of the methodological problems of this approach, but instead concentrate upon their conclusions. They first report upon four micro-level studies of government support for commercial R&D (in the US, Japan, Norway and Israel). Of the four examples reviewed, three show significant positive social benefits from government intervention. The Norwegian project is more problematic. Surveying the wider literature, Klette et al. quote a number of studies that show that the social return to R&D is much higher than the private return and that spillovers are significant in the evaluation of government support programmes. What is not supplied, however, is a single point estimate of the rate of return to government R&D spend of this kind. This is not surprising. Their conclusion is much more limited. They state that, if asked for a concise summary of the paper, the reply would be 'It is all very difficult'.
The Science Budget
Government expenditure on science could be considered a basic characteristic of a civilised society in a manner similar to expenditure on the arts. Knowledge is valuable for its own sake quite apart from any benefits to which it gives rise. The problem with this argument is that, if this is all that science yields, then there is little reason why the science spend should be more than the arts spend. It is therefore a dangerous argument upon which to rely for the justification of such spending. This is not to say that there is no such 'arts-like' benefit. It exists; however, it is very difficult to value.
Measures of the effectiveness of or the return to the science spend thus tend to rely upon the identification and measurement of more concrete returns. There is a growing literature in this field, neatly summarised by Martin and Salter (1996) in a report to HM Treasury, and thus to a large degree what I say below is based upon that report. The report argues that 'the traditional view of basic research as a source merely of useful codified information is too simple and misleading. It neglects the often larger benefits of trained researchers, improved instrumentation and methods, tacit knowledge and membership of national and international networks'.
Martin and Salter (hereafter M&S) quote estimates in the econometric literature of a rate of return to basic science of 28 per cent but they consider that the precision of this figure is open to doubt and that the methodology largely ignores the other benefits quoted immediately above. They do accept, however, that publicly funded basic research seems to have a substantial impact on national productivity and competitiveness, arguably through mastery over technology derived from better understanding of basic scientific processes underlying technology. Such understanding will be of increasing rather than lesser importance in the future. It is made clear that the relationship between basic research and technological advance differs across industries and products.
The less easily measurable benefits of basic research are more difficult to quantify. The ability to interconnect to international knowledge networks may be of increasing importance as knowledge becomes global. The supply of highly educated manpower is a key to understanding and utilising the world stock of knowledge. Improved instrumentation and methodology may well be crucial to maintaining or generating competitiveness in a number of industrial sectors.
Overall, the literature as reviewed by M&S indicates rates of return to basic research that are high. The quoted 28 per cent is imprecise and is only measuring part of the return. It would, however, suggest that greater levels of investment in basic research in the UK could be justified, the cost of capital being considerably less than 28 per cent.
However, the literature gives us no insight into, inter alia, whether the rate of return is being maximised. For example, are UK science resources being placed in the right technological areas and allocated to the most effective researchers and are the results being used to the greatest benefit of the UK economy? In fact, one might argue that, given the objectives of researchers (peer evaluation), there may well be means to improve the rate of return. However, as yet, no reliable means has been proposed that would enable reliable a priori evaluation of the potential returns to different basic science projects. Peer evaluation, i.e. the quality of the science, is still the main selection mechanism (even if within the framework of Technology Foresight guidelines). Although this may not maximise the return viewed in the traditional way, it may well be a reliable way of maximising the other returns (for example, trained manpower, access to the world knowledge stock, instrumentation and methods).
Overall, therefore, one might consider UK expenditure upon basic research (the science budget) as generally effective. However, there is no guarantee that it is maximally effective. Nor have we any guidelines that would guarantee that the extra spending that the returns seem to suggest to be desirable is undertaken in the most desirable areas.
Launch Aid
Launch Aid is one of the longest lasting of all forms of technology policy in the UK.
2 First instituted in 1947 as a means to (re)generate a nascent civil aviation industry in the UK, it still survives, although in a modified form, today. It is the only form of technology policy that is embodied within an Act of Parliament (originally the 1948 and 1949 Civil Aviation Acts and subsequently the Civil Aviation Acts of 1968 and 1982) . The principle of Launch Aid is that 'the government provides launch capital for non recurring development costs which is repaid from levies or royalties on the sale of aircraft or engines'. Launch Aid is administered by the Department of Trade and Industry and is now almost unique in the DTI portfolio in providing support for actual product and process development expenditures within large firms.
Launch Aid has generally been justified on the grounds that the risks involved in the launch of new civil aircraft and engines have been too large to expect the private firm (or its financiers) to bear. The principle behind it is thus to shift the risk to government. With Launch Aid being a sales-contingent 2 The commentary here is largely based upon Kaivanto (1995 Kaivanto ( , 1996a Kaivanto ( and 1996b . Kim Kaivanto is one of my doctoral students.
contract, if the project fails then it is the government that bears the loss rather than the firm. Moreover, as the repayment terms are generally set such that the government only recoups its initial investment, if the project is a success then the firm will make at least the same net returns as if private funding had been used.
The actual terms of the Launch Aid contract have been changed over the years. The latest arrangements resulted from an EC-US argument over subsidies to national aircraft producers. The 1992 EC-US agreement entails ! restriction of Launch Aid to 33 per cent of total development costs, with 25 per cent to be repaid at the cost of government borrowing and the remaining 8 per cent to be repaid at that rate plus 1 percentage point; ! a maximum reimbursement period of 17 years, and 20 per cent of the repayment to be made over the first 40 per cent of aircraft deliveries (70 per cent over the first 85 per cent).
Launch Aid grants have always been discretionary: there is no standing or prior provisions for Launch Aid in the government budget and thus all applications are considered against other competing demand for government funds. There are no set criteria that guarantee success of an application, nor are there fixed rules for determining the government contribution. It is worth noting that the national governments of most partners in the Airbus consortium have adopted Launch Aid schemes to assist these partners. It also worth noting that such risk-shifting policies exist in, for example, the Netherlands and Finland for the support of project development in SMEs. However, in the UK, the aerospace industry is unique in having such assistance available to it.
As an 'old-style' product development policy, it is worth exploring the effectiveness of the policy. This may be done on a number of levels. First, one may ask whether the policy has managed to obtain returns equivalent to its internal targets, i.e. a return equal to the investment made by government (plus the appropriate interest charge). If it has not, one might even consider the scheme as only a poorly veiled attempt to provide a general subsidy to the industry. Gardner (1976) , in an early review of Launch Aid experience, argued that of all the projects financed from 1948 through to the date of his review, only onethe Viscount -ever paid back receipts to government. Since 1970, only seven projects have actually been funded under Launch Aid: Concorde, RB211, Westland 30, V2500, A320, EH101 and the A330/340. These projects generated net disbursements (expenditure greater than receipts) on Launch Aid for each year between 1970-71 and 1991-92 (except for a small net receipt in 1977-78). However, by 1991-92, only the A330/340 and the EH101 were receiving Launch Aid whereas the RB211 and the A320 were generating government receipts. The last tranche of funding to the A330/340 was in 1992-93 so that, beyond that date, only the EH101 was still receiving Launch Aid. At the same time, receipts from the A320, the RB211 and the A330/340 started to build up. Since 1992-93, net Launch Aid expenditure has been negative in the range £40-60 million per year with estimated out-turns of -£110 million in 1997-98 and -£171 million in 1998-99. These net receipts may well be reversed if new applications currently sitting on the government's desk (for example, the Airbus super jumbo) are approved.
Thus, post-Concorde, Launch Aid projects have been much more successful. Partly as a result of this and partly as a result of the unwinding of the scheme with few new projects being started when existing projects were in the pay-back phase, the scheme has been a net contributor to government for the last seven years. One cannot precisely calculate pay-backs and contributions project by project from publicly available data, but it looks as if Launch Aid has, of late at least, been close to meeting its own internal objectives of generating a pay-back of the loans made plus appropriate interest.
There is, however, a wider issue relating to Launch Aid. Is it effective in a more general sense? Representatives of the civil aircraft industry have argued that the industry is an important part of the UK economy with an impressive export record and that, to some degree at least, this is due to the continuing availability of Launch Aid. There are, however, a number of questions that must be answered before one could agree that the policy is effective:
(a) Does the policy produce additionality, i.e. would the projects that have been undertaken not have been done without Launch Aid? The arguments here are, of course, complex. The rationale for Launch Aid is that the private sector would not fund the large risky projects involved. One must have some doubt with regard to this in the light of (i) the financing found for the Channel Tunnel project and (ii) the extent to which, over the last 15 years, the aircraft manufacturers have been willing to take on large amounts of risk through a switch of airlines policy from outright purchasing of civil aircraft to one of leasing, often from manufacturers. (b) What is the pay-off to the UK of having a civil aviation industry? There is a literature that argues that the existence of Airbus Industrie limits Boeing's monopoly power and thus keeps down world aircraft prices to the benefit of the UK and the world economy (Baldwin and Krugman, 1988) . The UK share of this benefit is, however, small. There are, of course, the high exports that the industry generates. However, one cannot but wonder whether the skills and knowledge used in civil aircraft might be better employed elsewhere in the economy or whether the use of Launch Aid to help SMEs in other industries to develop and launch new products may have yielded a bigger pay-off. (c) One might note, however, that, with the increasing internationalisation of the civil aircraft industry and the involvement of the UK industry in international projects where the partners are receiving Launch Aid from their national governments, it may be rather difficult to draw back from the policy.
VI. THE FUTURE
With the coming to power of the Labour government in May 1997, a major comprehensive spending review was initiated across all government departments and all areas of spending including R&D. Published figures (in SET98) on spending plans originating from prior to the conclusion of that review thus became obsolete as new priorities and spending patterns were put in place. At the time of writing, however, there are no publicly available data on the totality of the government's future R&D spending plans (as of early July 1999 , details of Forward Look 1999 and Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1999 are just beginning to appear on the DTI web page). This section thus considers just three areas, making use of what data are available. The first area is science, where increased spending plans have been announced. The second area is defence, where some material is available. The third area is the DTI, where the Competitiveness White Paper gives reasonable guidance as to the future.
The Science Budget 1999-00 to 2001-02
Information taken from the DTI/OST home page entitled 'Allocations of the science budget 1999-00 to 2001-02' provides details of the outcome of the Comprehensive Spending Review as it affects the science budget. The plan is to increase the science budget by £700 million over three years in the context of additional support to the science and engineering base (i.e. including the Higher Education Funding Councils) of £1.4 billion. The planned spend and recent spends are as in Table 10 . The extra expenditure thus reverses recent (1996-97 to 1998-99) real declines in the science budget and will probably reinforce the increasing share of the government R&D budget going to the science and engineering base (SEB). The extra funding going to the SEB over and above the increase in the science budget is made up of three parts (over three years): an extra £300 million for the DFEE, £100 million to build a new synchroton radiation source at Daresbury (a project to which the Wellcome Trust will also contribute), plus another £300 million as half of a Joint Infrastructure Fund (joint with the Wellcome Trust) to address the infrastructure problem in universities. The direct collaboration with a research funding charity (the Wellcome Trust), especially on this scale, is a new initiative for the UK government.
The current government view of science funding can be transmitted through two relevant quotations from the source: 'The Science Base is the absolute bedrock of our economic performance' and 'A viable and internationally competitive research base is accepted as essential to the future industrial and commercial strength of the country, and hence also to the prosperity and well being of the UK population'. However, perhaps as a warning, this document also states A key finding of the Comprehensive Spending Review was that, while much has been done in recent years to encourage exploitation of Science Base outcomes, still more is needed. In particular there is a need to increase the degree of interaction between UK firms and the Science Base, to ensure that UK firms maximise their opportunities to become fully competitive and to ensure that maximum value is realised from the public investment in the Science Base.
To facilitate such interaction, a University Challenge Fund (using £20 million from the science budget and £20 million from the Wellcome Foundation and the Gatsby Trust) has been initiated to encourage, through seed funding, the transformation of 'good research into good business'.
Defence R&D
Research Fortnight (28 April 1999) indicates that, in cash terms, the defence research budget planned for 1999-00 will be £453 million. This is seen as a fall of 15 per cent in cash terms since 1996-97 and of almost 50 per cent in real terms since 1985. The falling share of defence R&D in the total R&D spend will thus continue into the future. The source also suggests that the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency is poised for at least partial privatisation. 
The Department of Trade and Industry
Although no hard data are available on future DTI R&D spends, it is clear from the Competitiveness White Paper (Department of Trade and Industry, 1998) that the department's current emphasis upon enabling innovation through creating an innovation-friendly environment will continue, as opposed to any return to explicit subsidies for particular product and process innovations. The White Paper also fully embraces the concept of the knowledge economy and expresses a desire and measures to ensure that the UK will be a full participant in the world knowledge economy. The environmental improvements encompass, inter alia, changes in regulations, reviews of tax regimes, encouraging private R&D spending, improving the functioning of capital markets, improving competitive pressures, improving the skills base and encouraging innovation and productivity in government.
The Future: An Overview
Although the future pattern of the government R&D spend is not entirely clear, the main characteristics appear to be an increased science spend, a reduced military spend and a technology policy that is more concerned with the innovative climate than with subsidising particular projects, processes or firms (except perhaps for Launch Aid). This is very much a reinforcement of recent trends. In terms of evaluation, it reflects the apparent effectiveness of basic research (although emphasises that full benefits will only be realised if the science base is fully exploited). The defence R&D reductions may also well reflect the current rather catholic view of the need for and pay-off from such spending. The continuing DTI emphasis on issues relating to the innovative environment is not fully consistent with the academic literature, which suggests that there may well be pay-offs to government support for particular products and processes. It may well, however, reflect some scepticism as to whether such spending has been effective in the UK in the past.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Over the 10 years through to 1998, the UK government has reduced its expenditure on science, engineering and technology (SET) and research and development (R&D). The remaining spending has been reorientated towards science and the basic end of the spectrum, and away from both defence R&D and the support of technology and particularly the support of particular products and processes in large firms. Recent policy announcements of enhanced spending upon the science base will further emphasise the move towards the basic end of the spectrum. There are a number of causes that lead governments to spend on R&D. The main primary purposes of government R&D in the UK are to support the provision of government services (largely defence) and general support (including the science spend). Technology support activity -i.e. the stimulation of particular technologies in UK industry -is now relatively unimportant in the total spend. Different purposes are justified on different grounds. I have argued that market failure is endemic in technological change and market failure can and has been used to justify government spending both on science and on technology support. On the other hand, concern with the international competitiveness of the UK economy is also used as a justification.
This paper has reviewed the SET activities of the two main spending departments -the MOD and the DTI -and the science budget. In doing so, it has raised more questions than answers. The effectiveness of general technology support policies, Launch Aid and the science spend has also been reviewed. My review of effectiveness is generally positive. This positive attitude indicates that further government R&D spending may be justified, and my quick look at the future suggests that, in science at least, higher spending is in prospect. For the MOD, the opposite appears to be the case. The DTI, on the other hand, appears to be continuing its emphasis upon the creation of an innovation-friendly environment rather than high levels of spending per se. 
